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Introduction 
The election of Donald Trump has context (Patomäki, 2018; Dodd et al, 2017; 
Fullbrook and Morgan, 2017; Johnston, 2018; Formisano, 2015). Within that context 
what we want to suggest in this brief polemic is that Trump’s words, actions and 
inactions are potentially deeply damaging to the legitimacy of the office he holds and 
to the continuity of the institutions defining that position. This, writ large, is an issue 
for organization theory. Trump’s tenure can be described as a kind of organizational 
disarray. His administration is understaffed, detached and disembedded, such that it 
is characterised by its disconnectedness and disorganization. However, it is the 
qualities of this organizational anathema that matter.   
 
Most accounts of social reality explore the ontology of agent structure relationships. 
Searle’s concept of status functions seems particularly apt here (Searle, 2010; for 
constructive critique see Lawson, 2016).1  A status function is a function conferred on 
an object or person that could not exist merely as an attribute of that object or person. 
It is a consequence of collective agreement or recognition of the status and that 
enables that status. According to Searle, status functions are of central importance 
because rights, duties, obligations, permissions, and entitlements are associated with 
them. A status function confers “deontic powers”. These, in turn, are brought into 
existence within constitutive rule systems that then give rise to institutional facts (for 
summary of nuance see Searle, 2010: 3-24). So, it is an institutional fact that Donald 
Trump is President of the United States. His status has the general form of “X counts 
as Y in context C”: Trump counts as President because he was elected according to the 
rules, regulations and conventions of the American political system. However, for X to 
count as Y is not simply a formal set of conditions. It is also an ongoing act of 
performance within the expected norms governing that position. Without this 
expected performance, the continued recognition of X as Y is brought into question, 
and there is a real possibility that Y as a position is thereby undermined in the long 
term.  
   
The Trump presidency very clearly invokes problems of status dysfunction. For Searle, 
appropriately holding a position is transformative. Inter alia, the position creates 
desire-independent reasons for acting that affect conduct (Searle, 2010: 127-128).2 
                                                     
1 The nature of social reality is a subject of longstanding debate in organization theory (see e.g. Hasard 
and Prim 1990; Ackroyd and Fleetwood, 2000; Edwards et al, 2014).  
2 Note, it is not possible in a brief polemic to address all aspects of the life’s work of a prolific 
philosopher and social theorist such as Searle.  It is useful to bear in mind that 1) For Searle his is a 
philosophy for the social sciences not a philosophy of the social sciences; it is intended as a simplified 
apparatus that expresses the common constituents from which social reality is built, 2) status functions 
are about the meaningful pursuit of living socially, and though the efficacy of completing a task may be 
a goal of living socially Searle’s work is a sustained critique of behaviourism and functionalism (for 
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That is, one suppresses inclinations and modifies behaviour. This extends from the 
mundane and generic ‘I don’t feel like it right now’ or ‘I’d rather just do x’ (we go to 
work, we respect the rights of others etc) to more specific activity that is shaped in 
relation to complexly formed expectations. The US presidency is one such position 
(Searle, 2010: pp. 160-173). Ultimately, it involves a requirement to protect the 
integrity of the position. However, “presidential” has context and nuance. The 
argument coalesces around two statements and concludes with one question: 
 
1. Trump has not placed himself in a position to be competent, he does not conform 
to expectations of the role of president and fails to conform to conventional 
presidential practice; 
2. It is not that one expects an “ideal” president, but rather that the US presidency is 
constituted by an ideal, in relation to a set of norms, powers and functions; 
3. If Trump’s presidency is status dysfunctional what does this suggest regarding the 
future of political culture and institutions?      
 
Competency, conforming to expectations and presidential practice 
 
Over time roles acquire expectations associated with what it means to occupy or 
express that role. This is because a role involves combinations of formal and informal 
rules, norms and practices. A role is positioned and relational and typically purposive. 
It is enacted in terms of how it is positioned, the relations that locate that position and 
the purposes attributed to it. These create grounds by which it is possible to be more 
and less competent and to succeed or fail in conveying competency. Incompetency 
thus depends on, at least in part, whether a position-holder fails to perform 
appropriately in regard of a status function: how X counts as Y (Searle, 1995: 48). Since 
occupying the role of president, Trump has manifestly failed to convey competency 
when considered in terms of the norms and expectations of a US president and this 
has been expressed in practice. As such, as we explore below, he has been widely 
judged to be incompetent. This speaks to status dysfunction, though competency may 
have other grounds (getting things done, see later).  
 
A fairly consistent picture has emerged in the press of a man who has not placed 
himself in a position to be or become competent in the stated terms and who seems 
unwilling and perhaps unable to do so. Trump responds that he is judged unfairly by 
a hostile “fake” media. However, it is numerous leaks from within Trump’s own 
administration, cabinet and wider circle of communicants that provide much of the 
testimony, albeit some of this is not disinterested (see Comey 2018, Frum, 2018 and 
Wolff, 2018). According to these testimonies and other sources, he is difficult to brief, 
limited in attention span and a priori ignorant of much of the substantive remit of the 
agencies and operation of government he oversees. He is portrayed as a man more 
attuned and responsive to Fox News than to expert informed advice.3 This is a 
                                                     
example, social activity based on obligation presupposes a “gap” or the possibility of deciding not to do 
something).  
3 While himself responsive to Fox News, Trump can nonetheless become embarrassing for its news 
anchors. On 26 March 2018 Trump’s telephone interview on “Fox and Friends,” was eventually 
 3 
different issue than whether that advice has ideational-ideological inflection. Trump 
tends to emphasise instinct and intuition but admits no contradiction in rooting these 
in ignorance of context and precedent (sometimes denying that he did not know, 
sometimes conflating ignorance with repudiation of past practices, despite that one 
cannot reasonably repudiate what one is ignorant of).4 Perhaps the most quotable 
appellations in 2017 were attributed to Rex Tillerson (“f***ing moron”) and H. R 
McMaster (“idiot” with the intelligence of a “kindergartner”) (Bernstein, 2017).5 
 
Of course, advice itself is conditional on the expertise and positioning of the adviser. 
The Trump White House too does not conform to expectations and this too speaks to 
dysfunction. The administration stands out as disconnected or disembedded and 
disorganized. This state of affairs cannot stop time. Things are still done, events still 
occur and politics does not cease. However, organizational disarray affects what 
happens and how it happens, and amongst other things creates multiple opportunities 
for others to exploit. Organizational problems with the Trump administration have 
taken various forms.   
 
The turnover of staff within Trump’s administration is unprecedented (Tenpas, 2018). 
As of July 2018, this included a chief of staff, a chief political strategist, a chief 
economic adviser, a press secretary, a White House staff secretary, four 
communication directors, an acting attorney general, an FBI director, a chief 
administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, a secretary of veteran affairs 
and two national security advisers.  
 
Many of the persons occupying roles in Trump’s cabinet lack the kinds of qualifications 
and experience usually required to occupy those roles. For example, Betsy Devos as 
Education Secretary.6 In some instances the sense of organizational anathema is 
compounded by problems of nepotism as well as unrealistic expectations. For 
example, Ivanka Trump’s wandering role as unofficial stand-in for the president or 
Jared Kushner as senior adviser. Kushner’s portfolio of responsibilities has variously 
included Middle East peace, overseeing the reform of Federal government, 
implementation of “innovation”, resolving the opioid epidemic and relations with key 
trading nations (Baker et al, 2017). This is a portfolio that would exceed the 
capabilities of someone with demonstrated expertise and experience in any of these 
areas. In other instances, persons have occupied roles that they are actively hostile 
                                                     
interrupted and ended by a host declaring: “We could talk to you all day but it looks like — you have a 
million things to do.” Blake (2018) 
4 Well known examples of such situations include Trump’s lack of knowledge of the US defence nuclear 
triad, which came to light at a December 2015 Republican debate event; his apparent ignorance of who 
was responsible for the decision to move the American embassy in the UK, and the implied ignorance 
of the nature of Brexit, encapsulated in his advice to Prime Minister Theresa May that she should sue 
the EU.  
5 Emphasis varies; Comey, for example, is suspicious of overplaying Trump’s mental competence since 
he thinks this reduces the responsibility he bears as morally unfit. Woodward’s (2018) later text serves 
to confirm the general picture.      
6Her main qualifications to be Education Secretary were a combination of private advocacy of charter 
schools and her family wealth. When questioned on CBS 60 Minutes, March 2018 she was unable to 
provide informed opinion on the public school system in her home state of Michigan.  
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towards. For example, Scott Pruitt, now former administrator of the Environmental 
Protection Agency.  
 
According to the Partnership for Public Service Political Appointee Tracker, 
approximately 1,200 positions are executive branch nominations requiring Senate 
confirmation. Of these 656 are “key” and as of April 2018, only 387 had been 
confirmed.7 Over and above this the Partnership reports that attrition rates for civil 
servants are higher under Trump than previous presidencies and the loss of non-
partisan Federal expertise on public health, climate science, cybersecurity, trade and 
many other areas cumulatively denies the administration the possibility of well-
informed advice (see also Stier, 2018).     
 
Trump positioned himself as a purportedly anti-establishment opposition figure, as a 
break with the political norm, so some of his appointments have been precisely not to 
meet past expectations. However, as the above indicates, this is different than 
whether he has undertaken to place himself in a position of competency and whether 
those around him are able to maintain a relationship where competency can be 
demonstrated.  
 
Trump campaigned as the alternative to a broken politics of elites and claimed to have 
readily available simple solutions to longstanding entrenched and complex problems. 
He positioned himself as a disruptive force with consummate “deal-making” 
credentials. It is in this context that Trump’s approach to policy also stands out as 
aberrational and this too speaks to dysfunction. His approach has not conformed to 
past conventional presidential practice. Trump has shown little or no command of 
fact. Rather he has actively conflated fakery (untruth, falsity) with mainstream media 
fact-checking and unfavourable commentary (Kakutani, 2018).  At the same time, his 
grasp of policy, practice and process seems tenuous, despite that he has been able to 
pursue some activity that benefits his own interests.  In general, policy has been left 
unformulated and undetailed (most notably continued gaps and placeholder clauses 
in the formulation of legislation for healthcare reform). Trump has continued to 
campaign as though standing for office, appearing at rallies that repeat familiar 
(divisive) themes, but this format does not demonstrate a transition to the practice of 
governing; he has not and does not communicate integrated principles and policy 
specifics behind which he stands and behind which others could be persuaded to align 
because of those specifics.  
 
Faced with opposition or scepticism past presidents sought to persuade through 
targeted communication. Though this has often involved slogans and soundbites, it 
has not reduced to them (see for background Nelson, 2014). Past presidents have 
deferred to designated cabinet appointees and realised the need to be briefed, at the 
same time they have recognized the value in seeking to project consistency and 
coherency in order to enhance plausibility and build momentum. They may not have 
always been successful but they recognized the need to discipline themselves. Trump 
                                                     
7https://ourpublicservice.org/issues/presidential-transition/political-appointee-tracker.php Accessed 
12/4/18  
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has been unable to do this and this has been one reason why his first attempts to 
translate policy into law faltered. Again, this is a different issue than whether one 
approves of the ideational-ideological inflection of policy. 
 
During 2017 the Republicans had an unprecedented degree of dominance in formal 
politics: they controlled the presidency, both houses of Congress, 32 state legislatures 
and 33 governorships. And yet after one year in office Trump managed to bring only 
one piece of legislation through Congress, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, December 2017, 
and whatever else this achieved (perhaps a short run boost to consumption based 
growth) it also represented a huge upward redistribution to the wealthy. Trump 
otherwise failed to deliver legislation on his key campaign commitments. Instead, his 
first year consisted mainly of presidential security directives, memoranda and 
executive orders, all of which either bypass or do not directly depend on Congress.  
 
Unilateralism is not new. All modern US presidents have used executive orders and 
memoranda but none have previously overwhelmingly relied on them, and done so 
whilst unable to develop legislation at a time their party dominated the main venues 
of decision making. During his first 100 days Trump issued 30 orders compared to 19 
by Obama, and this was the highest number since Truman and Roosevelt (Ingraham, 
2017).8 This does not speak to the narrative of a consummate “dealmaker”. It seems 
to demonstrate the opposite. Numerous other examples occur. In early 2018 funding 
for Trump’s Mexican “Wall” was on offer from Democrats in Congress in exchange for 
guaranteeing the rights of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“dreamers”), as 
part of Federal budget negotiations. Trump, however, was unable to act decisively and 
the deal collapsed.  
 
Moreover, failures have then been rolled into subsequent events. Trump’s zero-
tolerance reinterpretation of criminalised immigration in mid-2018 created a sense of 
crisis. The fear this invokes through the conflation of asylum with organized gang 
activity (MS-13 etc) may serve a tactical purpose in subsequent elections, but it was 
also a specific public relations disaster once reports of the separation of families began 
to circulate. This created a surreal situation in which Trump sought approval for the 
(partial) reversal of his own decision. In general, faced with setbacks Trump has 
resorted to dereliction and tended more to retrospectively disown rather than pro-
actively own policy. He has tended to harangue and retreat to Twitter, combining, in 
terms of norms of presidential behaviour, irresponsibility with a failure to take 
responsibility.  
 
In short, Trump has failed to meet normal expectations of the presidency through 
practice. In a brute sense Trump is president. In Searle’s initial terms, he is an X who 
counts as president (Y). However, though he is president he has not become 
presidential. He has been deemed incompetent in so far as he does not seem to have 
appropriately occupied the position. However, this can be distinguished from whether 
he continues to be approved of by some subset of voters and whether he has, in some 
                                                     
8 Moreover, Trump consistently claimed during campaigning that dependence on executive orders was 
a sign of (when used by Obama) a weak leader who “can’t get anything done”.   
 6 
sense, followed through on campaign commitments. Arguably, he has done or begun 
to do some version of many of the things he said he would: he has disrupted 
“Obamacare”, created a hostile environment for immigration, continued to raise the 
issue of funding for his wall, challenged NATO members over their defence spending, 
confronted Iran, withdrawn and/or demanded alteration to trade treaties and 
initiated tariffs that target countries and regions with trade surpluses with the US. This 
raises a different more instrumental set of issues for competency than conformity to 
expectations of the office of president.9  
 
However, one should not conflate activity and events with ultimate consequences. 
Trump has begun many things but what will arise from them may be quite different. 
Withdrawals, violations, and hostilities are specific disruptions but not constructive 
solutions and yet cannot persist without them. Most cases are not conflicts that can 
simply be won by destroying an opponent.  
 
Moreover, the very process of antagonistic, unpredictable disruption undermines the 
basic trust in and sense of dependability of institutions typically required for problems 
to be addressed and transcended. Trump’s activity as president does not seem to 
indicate he has a reasonable grasp of this and this infects perceptions of initiatives 
that might otherwise be viewed more positively (his willingness to meet and apparent 
sense of ease with authoritarian figures). In terms of grasp, the reverse seems to be 
the case, his conduct has somehow made the current presidency a problem to be 
excused or managed, domestically and also internationally. This has put the current 
presidency at odds with the historical projection of the USA (propaganda and double 
standards though it may involve) as a source and supporter of rules-based continuity 
in the world. This has placed the legitimacy of the presidency in question and this too 
is a matter of status dysfunction. In Trump’s case this extends to problems of law and 
conduct. 
 
An ideal president and the presidency as a regulated ideal 
 
Evidence and law will likely not be irrelevant to Trump’s eventual fate. He is vulnerable 
at both State and Federal level, notably via some combination of criminal prosecution 
of members of his legal and advisory team, and the Title 28 modification to Title VI of 
the post-Nixon Ethics in Government Act 1978, which empowers an appointed special 
prosecutor. However, it would be overly simplistic to suggest that being president is 
readily reducible to performance in terms of a narrow set of formal conditions, even 
at the extreme. Article 2 Section 4 of the US constitution (removal from office 
following impeachment), Article 1 Section 9 (emoluments), or the 25th Amendment 
(“fitness for office”) require a set of politically posed mechanisms and decisions. They 
are not simply matters of law. Moreover, politics is in a certain sense also “theatre” 
and political office has allowed for and survived many personality types exhibiting a 
                                                     
9 The limit case here may also stretch the claim of organisational disarray. One might argue the Christian 
Right have supported Trump despite his defects because he provides a means to ensure Supreme Court 
appointees will be favourable to the striking down of Roe versus Wade. To refer back to previous 
phrasing as an opportunity for others to exploit he is thus highly effective.    
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wide range of conduct (see Woodward, 1999). And yet, caveats notwithstanding, 
Trump still stands out.  
 
Consider the range and frequency of revelations, accusations, and investigations that 
attach to Trump’s administration. These include various allegations of impropriety, 
infidelity, sexual misconduct, nepotism, profligate spending, corruption, fraud, 
dishonesty, perjury, and obstruction of justice.10 The matter of collusion with Russia 
hangs over the Trump presidency but by no means is exhaustive of the problems of it. 
The Trump administration is scandal prone and diminishingly unlikely to become 
scandal free, not least because future scandals may have their origins in past business 
practices. One can become inured to Trump but this should not be conflated with 
normalisation. Hardly a day passes without report of some other cause for concern, 
and these fit a transgressive narrative.11  
  
For example, Trump was the first modern US president not to place his business 
dealings in a blind trust, and this not only immediately exposed the administration to 
influence via concessions for his family’s global property empire but also set the tone 
for cabinet appointees to blur personal comfort, convenience, interest, and serving 
corporate funded ends through “public service”. Some degree of blurring has long 
been a feature of American democracy, but Trump campaigned to “drain the swamp” 
and features of this blurring have always been positioned in public discourse as 
something to be suppressed and criticised. His own base object to them. The Trump 
administration thus stands as an exception, one that hides in plain sight. Arguably its 
capacity to do so is enabled by Trump’s persistent attack on the media, despite that 
this clearly has long term harmful implications for the political system (Kakutani, 
2018). In any case, the perception of Trump is not created by any single aberrant event 
but rather the varied, multiple, and continual accumulation of events. This is not a 
party-political point but rather an issue of whether one’s conduct does harm to (as 
well as signals fracture in) political discourse.  
 
The authority of office is given not a “given”. It can be reproduced or undermined 
along with the office. It is inherent to Searle’s status function concept that there is a 
separation between the person and the position or office held. The office is 
positioned to confer powers on the person. However, a tension then arises because 
the capacity for the powers to be recognized rests also on the conduct of the person, 
in so far as they uphold the office. The separation is not complete, a real time 
operative sociology must apply (and this is problematic for Searle’s work; see Archer, 
2008). Authority has an absolute cut-off point, if and when a president is removed 
from office, but the legitimacy of the office can also be corroded in a more diffuse 
sense and this can be brought about by many different types of conduct. For example, 
one might distinguish between the vulgarity of speech and the sentiment or 
                                                     
10 The scope and remit of investigations is currently cumulative and more than 75 charges had been 
prepared against Trump associates as of mid-2018. 
11 Many organizations, some more partisan than others now provide and track evidence regarding 
corruption and dishonesty in the Trump administration. For example, the Centre for American Progress 
(Berger and Calais-Haase, 2018).   
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substance of what is conveyed, as well as the behaviour that attaches to these. Trump 
is transgressive in all these senses.  
 
Not only has Trump been observed to tolerate intolerance and equivocate regarding 
the unequivocal, he has also personalised the procedural in ways that seem to 
commentators overtly vindictive, spiteful or petty. Events in Charlottesville, Virginia 
August 2017 illustrate this. Not only did Trump vacillate concerning his official 
response, but he then personalised his response to the response of others to his 
vacillation. This led to a string of resignations from his business advisory councils, 
notably Kenneth Frazier, the prominent Black American CEO of Merck 
pharmaceuticals. Trump’s response to Frazier was not a polite expression of 
disappointment, a thank you for your service, I hope you subsequently change your 
mind, but rather an immediate Twitter attack on the business dealings of Merck. This 
ill-advised response simply exacerbated the situation, ultimately forcing Trump to 
disband his councils. 
 
To be clear, Trump is not the first president to be divisive (one might point to Reagan’s 
“welfare queens”; see Rossinow, 2015). But even in this context Trump’s conduct as 
a president is aberrant in multiple ways. He was unable to even simulate sustained 
other-centred concern, though it seemed strategically in his interest to do so. He did 
not seek to consistently express (and if he was advised to do so seems to have ignored 
that advice) sentiments that calm an already incendiary situation. These are not 
incompatible with otherwise divisive stances, they are part of presidential 
performance, of how X counts as Y. This provides grounds for a president to respond 
to the consequences of their own more strategic expression of division. In articulating 
division, it has been typical to attempt to construct a moral high ground and to place 
behind this ground multiple justifications, such as the protection of order or the 
possibility of future consensus (and here one might point to the many variant claims 
presidents have made on a “silent majority”). These provide discursive context for a 
president to subsequently express targeted “disappointment” with groups who the 
procedure isolates (enabling blame). Even division has depended in part on context-
aware behaviour that has included performance that at least uses the “dignity” of 
office and exhibits an understanding of how authority is constructed and legitimacy 
conferred.  
   
Trump, by contrast, is transgressive in quite a different way. This may garner approval 
or attention from some but it seems to do so in violation of the expected norms of 
the office of president. It seems insufficient to counter that the role of president has 
not “changed him” since if this is a product of ineptitude or insensitivity then it is not 
some alternative positive form of integrity. Moreover, his conduct speaks also to a 
track record that is more than tolerance of intolerance and extremes (consider 
Trump’s support of the Obama “birther” campaign, his reposting of anti-Muslim 
videos etc, Barbero, 2016; Ronson, 2017). Trump brings into question what it means 
for a US president to be on the wrong side of history (and this itself is a matter of how 
legitimate conduct has a time dynamic). Conflict over Civil War statues in the South 
has deep roots in different attempts to claim history and contest symbols, drawing 
different trajectories from the past.  
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There is no innocent reading of “it is just a statue” and a matter of “heritage”. This is 
itself a politicisation disguising the way the Civil War has been repositioned as a 
conflict over sovereignty between a doomed underdog South engaged in just war and 
an industrialised North. The fact that there can be anger and violence on both sides 
of a debate concerning the retention of potent symbols does not provide specific 
moral equivalence as a matter of tacit justification (or toleration) of violence and 
harm to protestors. It does not negate the need to contest and consider how history 
occurred and how it has been used as a tool of disenfranchisement, division and 
oppression. To attempt to play the simple “protection of heritage” card gives succour 
to racists and neo-Nazis.12 This sits awkwardly with progress in a multi-ethnic society 
and thus transgresses contemporary norms of legitimacy.    
 
In many ways then, Trump’s conduct has brought the legitimacy of the presidency into 
question and this too is an aspect of how he has not become presidential as a matter 
of status dysfunction. This is despite sporadic attempts to address this, notably the 
removal of Steve Bannon and a brief period of control asserted by John Kelly. There is 
no simple determination of this dysfunction and yet the “integrity of office” is not 
mere language nor is the phrase “bringing the office into disrepute” (see Woodward, 
1999; Nelson, 2014). In this sense, it is not that one expects an ideal president (as both 
Bush junior and Bill Clinton indicate) but rather that the presidency is an ideal, 
constituted by expectations to concur with a set of norms. Though a “West Wing” way, 
so eloquently expressed in the TV series as a self-aware gravitas aligned with 
dedicated selfless service, may be fiction, it speaks to a persistent regulating fiction. 
This is important since perception affects belief, and this in turn is mutually related to 
commitment and thus to reasons for legitimacy and authority to be given. That is, for 
the whole to be reproduced. A “House of Cards” Frank Underwood is no more tenable 
than a Jed Bartlett is realistic.   
 
Conclusion: Trump and democratic dilemmas 
 
Though one can locate Trump in the context of longstanding developments in US 
politics and foreign policy (see Gills and Patomäki, 2017; Arendt, 1971; Schmitt, 2013), 
Trump signals a fracture in political discourse. In homage to The Simpsons’ mayor, we 
might call the Trump effect a vicious variety of Quimbyism. His performance in office 
is, for example, antithetical to the basic conditions of social and political cohesion.  
This is not least because he brings into question the very idea that truth conditions 
matter and that norms of honesty, integrity etc must at least have some regulating 
                                                     
12 The Southern Poverty Law Centre tracks the number of hate groups in the US and reports an 
increased from 784 in 2014 to 954 end of 2017, (not including ones which are solely online), with much 
of the increase following Trump’s election (the main groups are White and Black nationalists and 
“Patriot” groups). https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2018/2017-year-hate-
and-extremism  
There is not the space here to address with subtlety all the relevant issues that constitute background, 
such as Manichean dichotomous myths of good/evil and rituals of enemy-construction in US politics 
(see Patomäki 2002).   
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function (Habermas, 1984).13 Trump is transgressive. However, the full significance of 
this cannot be reduced to a focus on his presidency in isolation as an issue of status 
functions. It speaks to democratic dilemmas.   
 
Critical organization theory (coalescing around the critical management studies group) 
tends to look for the constructive potential in transgressive situations, where previous 
settled forms of reproduction are disrupted (Alvesson and Wilmott, 2010). On the one 
hand, the Trump administration provides “permission structures” for prejudice to 
proliferate. The period is thus likely to provide fertile ground for future “dark side” 
case studies (see Linstead et al 2014). On the other hand, Trump serves also to 
provoke and energise political engagement and activity. This has multiple dynamics 
and potentials (see Zanoni et al, 2017). Perhaps its most propitious is that it draws 
attention to the tension between participation, representation and accountability. 
The post-Parkland shootings movement, for example, is expressly about reclaiming 
agency. However, some might argue so was the Tea Party, though its funding and 
positioning creates quite a different set of arguments, and these lead back to Trump 
and the relation between his presidency and US political culture and institutions. 
 
In being status dysfunctional Trump has shown systematic disdain for the institutions 
that elect, empower and act to provide checks and balances on the presidency. His 
conduct places pressure on the Constitution, testing its bounds and indicates a shift 
toward autocratic practices. How the rest of the system including Congress ultimately 
responds to this will be one measure of the vitality of a system of checks and balances, 
and Congress too can be given more or less legitimacy. So far, the evidence is mixed 
but does not inspire optimism. Congress has resisted an easy ride for legislation but 
been soft voiced or silent in the face of many of Trump’s most egregious acts, though 
Congressional elections can change this through effects on majorities. Trump may yet 
stand and be re-elected, at the same time, impeachment remains a possibility that the 
different Chambers of Congress may push. Moreover, it is not inconceivable that 
based on the pretence of restoring integrity to the office, Trump’s conduct as 
president will be used to make it more difficult in the future for outsider candidates 
to be nominated through the party process and run for office (and it is already difficult 
as Bernie Sanders can attest). This would signal a further corrosion of legitimacy. 
 
However, though Trump may not have won the popular vote his brand of punitive 
populism has a loyal following. The form this populism has taken under Trump may be 
problematic but many of the concerns invoked are relevant and real. Trump is 
simultaneously a product of processes such as globalization, financialization, 
deindustrialization and rising inequalities and a vocal protest against their effects on 
everyday lives of people (Fulbrook and Morgan, 2017; Morgan and Patomäki, 2017). 
Trump’s removal from office would not in itself resolve the underlying and long-
standing problems that caused him to be elected. Moreover, over decades, the US 
political system has become responsive through selection to the most affluent part of 
                                                     
13 According to Leonhardt & Thompson (2017) almost 60% of Americans consider Trump dishonest and 
there is a continual fact-checking operation of Trump commentary by various media outlets; see 
‘Trump’s Lies’, New York Times, 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/23/opinion/trumps-lies.html?_r=0  
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the population (APSA Task Force 2004). There is an overriding problem here regarding 
the future of democracy (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018; Patomäki 2018; Runciman, 
2018).14 The broader question it raises is whether there can be organizational renewal 
for democracy in the context of contemporary capitalism.  
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